On the Problem of the Truth of Knowledge in Philosophy of Science

The article is devoted to the problem of objectivity of scientifi c knowledge. Modern methodological concepts in the philosophy of science and their approaches to the understanding of the truth are critical analyzed. The author shows that the modern philosophy of science has come to relativism and denial of objective truth (Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend). Particular attention is paid to the concept of “third world” of Karl Popper, who is trying to overcome the relativism and subjectivism in scientifi c knowledge. However, as suggested by the author, Popper’s understanding of objective truth is formal. The author believes that to overcome relativism and theoretical anarchism in the philosophy of science must be linked to specifi c (dialectical) unity of ideal and real, history and logic in the development of scientifi c knowledge. This approach avoids a formal understanding of the truth and at the same time to keep its substantial unity as opposed to relativistic pluralism.