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The Concepts of Κοινὴ Αἴσθησις in Aristotle and Sensus Interior in Augustine
The article is dedicated to the analysis of such transgressive epistemological forms in history of philosophy as Aristotle’s “common sense” and Augustine’s “inner sense”. Studying these conceptions, the researcher consults the most influential sources of
this boundary problematic. The importance of this study is also explained by the fact that these fundamental concepts have not been sufficiently compared yet, nor the identity of their structural elements have been examined with due attention. Despite the considerable time-span and doctrinal differences, Aristotle’s κοινὴ αἴσθησις and Augustine’s sensus interior display an evident kinship.
Combining the determinacies of both sense and thought, they are similar in their basic functions, the first consisting in perceiving “the common sensibles”; the second being the dialectical faculty of positing the particularity in the sphere of sense perception and of removing its abstract independence by reducing to unity; the third being that of sense reflection. This reflexive nature of the “common/
inner sense” may give cause to superficial interpretations presenting it as a conscious or even self-conscious activity, which is, nevertheless, definitely refuted by an attentive reading.
this boundary problematic. The importance of this study is also explained by the fact that these fundamental concepts have not been sufficiently compared yet, nor the identity of their structural elements have been examined with due attention. Despite the considerable time-span and doctrinal differences, Aristotle’s κοινὴ αἴσθησις and Augustine’s sensus interior display an evident kinship.
Combining the determinacies of both sense and thought, they are similar in their basic functions, the first consisting in perceiving “the common sensibles”; the second being the dialectical faculty of positing the particularity in the sphere of sense perception and of removing its abstract independence by reducing to unity; the third being that of sense reflection. This reflexive nature of the “common/
inner sense” may give cause to superficial interpretations presenting it as a conscious or even self-conscious activity, which is, nevertheless, definitely refuted by an attentive reading.
κοινὴ αἴσθησις, «common sense», Aristotle, sensus interior, «inner sense», Augustine, soul, reflexivity, unconscious