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The Problem of a Constructive Dialogue between the Philosophy of Consciousness and Neuroscience: an Analysis of the Concepts of J. Searle, D. Chalmers, K.V. Anokhin and K.D. Frith
The study of consciousness and the cognitive process as a whole is of deep interest to both philosophers and representatives of various fi elds of science. Discussions revolve around the questions of 1) what is consciousness; 2) the relationship between consciousness and body, consciousness and brain, mental and physical; 3) how subjective experience is possible. The designation of the subject of the discussions already indicates the complexity and heteronomy of the problem of consciousness, which necessitates the use of theoretical and methodological tools corresponding to the level of complexity of the problem.
The authors use a comparative-analytical method to identify key methodological problems on the path of interdisciplinary dialogue between philosophy and neuroscience in the study of the phenomenon of consciousness.
The analysis of the arguments of representatives of the philosophy of consciousness and neuroscience allows us to conclude that the possibility of an interdisciplinary interaction between philosophy and neuroscience arises in the plane of such a discussion of the phenomenon of consciousness, where the understanding of the heteronomy and multilevel nature of this phenomenon is preserved. The key here is the question of subjective reality. At the same time, the inevitability of a conceptual gap between philosophy and neuroscience can be provoked by ignoring the "hard problem" in research. Especially if we take into account the fact that the key characteristic of subjective reality is the creation of meaning, which is associated with the understanding of one's own "Self",
the understanding of the "Other", and interaction with the outside world.
The most important thing to exclude the conceptual gap between the philosophy of consciousness and neuroscience is to abandon the reductionist model of understanding consciousness, based on reducing the complex, heterogeneous phenomenon of consciousness only to a certain, defi ned, although important, area of its possible study – to the activity of the cerebral cortex.
The authors use a comparative-analytical method to identify key methodological problems on the path of interdisciplinary dialogue between philosophy and neuroscience in the study of the phenomenon of consciousness.
The analysis of the arguments of representatives of the philosophy of consciousness and neuroscience allows us to conclude that the possibility of an interdisciplinary interaction between philosophy and neuroscience arises in the plane of such a discussion of the phenomenon of consciousness, where the understanding of the heteronomy and multilevel nature of this phenomenon is preserved. The key here is the question of subjective reality. At the same time, the inevitability of a conceptual gap between philosophy and neuroscience can be provoked by ignoring the "hard problem" in research. Especially if we take into account the fact that the key characteristic of subjective reality is the creation of meaning, which is associated with the understanding of one's own "Self",
the understanding of the "Other", and interaction with the outside world.
The most important thing to exclude the conceptual gap between the philosophy of consciousness and neuroscience is to abandon the reductionist model of understanding consciousness, based on reducing the complex, heterogeneous phenomenon of consciousness only to a certain, defi ned, although important, area of its possible study – to the activity of the cerebral cortex.
philosophy, neuroscience, consciousness, interdisciplinary approach, brain